INTRODUCTION
In 1864, a New York trial court confronted a fairly run-of-the-mill entrapment defense. ' The judge, like most judges at the time, rejected the defense, admonishing that the great Lawgiver overruled such tactics back when Eve complained, "the serpent beguiled me, and I did eat. ''2 The decades that followed witnessed an unprecedented retreat from this lofty precedent. State and federal courts throughout the union began to recognize and elaborate on the entrapment defense around the turn of the century." In 1932, the Supreme Court followed in kind by holding the defense implicit in all federal criminal statutes. 4 Ever since, entrapment has occupied a rather small and uncontroversial corner of criminal law. Recently, however, courts and scholars have struggled to define entrapment in the context of increasingly intrusive law enforcement techniques.
5
Analyzed in various ways, the entrapment defense excuses a defendant when the actions of government officials produced the crime of which he stands charged. Since its inception, most courts have employed a subjective test, asking whether the individual theoretical vacuum in its wake. As Morton Horwitz explained, by the time the progressive legal thinkers launched their attack on natural rights in the 1920s and 30s, the idea that the law could actually uncover some real subjective intent and preserve a sacred area of free will was already largely discredited.' 0 The vast and complicated nature of modern economic interactions had rendered that ideal mythical, at best." So, Oliver Wendell Holmes's reasonable man took the place of each individual and policy determined how that reasonable man should and would act in any given instance. 2 Legal historians argue that this set the stage for the law's turn to the social sciences. 3 Courts, however, never collapsed into mere brokers for different social scientific theories, and the notion that the law can, and should, seek to define subjective intent, freedom, and autonomy did not disappear. Rather, it migrated to different areas and took different forms. By uncovering those forms, we begin to catch a glimpse of how the law redefined freedom and individuality in reaction to the new constellation of economic, social, and political forces. Thus, entrapment grew as a response to the increasingly pervasive and invasive forms of law enforcement, but it was not an inevitable reaction to the sudden expansion in the nature and scope of state and federal police power. Entrapment emerged as a piece of a puzzle: an innovative way to police the boundaries between government and the individual in the newly drawn precincts of the modern state.
I have divided my discussion of the history of entrapment law to illustrate this thesis. Part I of this article briefly reviews the social and political context of post-Civil War America and elaborates on the changes in law enforcement at the time. Part II discusses the history of both the state and federal defense of 10 See HORWlTZ, supra note 8, at 33-65. 13-115 (1973) . In general, the turn to the social sciences could not solve the problem of determinism in the law. Most of the social sciences, after all, provided natural or psychological explanations for all human behavior.
See H. STUART HUGHES, CONSCIOUSNESS AND SOCIETY: THE REORIENTATION OF EUROPFAN Socit. THOUGHT, 1890 THOUGHT, -1930 THOUGHT, , at 4-5 (1977 . The law was left to concede or to find a new place for freedom within its doctrine. In researching entrapment, I have relied on Michel Foucault's notion of 'archaeology." Thus, the particular history of entrapment seems to me evidence of a significant mutation in the law. By analyzing the shift in this system of thought, we begin to understand the nature of individuality in the twentieth century, something that, to the modern eye, might seem inevitable, unquestionable, or necessary. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1972) . entrapment. Part III analyzes some of the implications of this history, gives an overview of the current debate over how the defense ought to function, and places it in context of the history of entrapment law. Finally, without falling too easily into the trap that history, custom, and past practice should dictate policy, I will argue that given the history of entrapment, a modified subjective test provides the appropriate analysis.' 5 In addition, the history of entrapment illustrates how the defense fits into criminal law and counsels against extending it to cases where private parties rather than government officials entrap an individual.
I. HISTORY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
Organized state police forces are a relatively modern innovation.
In the colonial period, citizens bore a collective responsibility for law enforcement and every adult male shared a duty to serve as constable or hire someone to take his turn 6 As individuals grew increasingly wary of such periodic police duties, many towns began to elect constables who would hire a number of watchmen, and the powers of the police increased gradually. 7 These constables had broad administrative responsibilities beyond law enforcement. ' Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, the police remained loosely organized and largely ineffectual.'9 Most towns employed one chief and a dozen or so patrolmen. as a result, police tended to focus on crimes against property, leaving many more violent personal crimes unsolved. 22 Law enforcement in the southern colonies was similarly haphazard, consisting, in most cases, of a single sheriff who harbored a vast number of responsibilities on top of policing. 23 Towns in the south, however, faced the additional problem of slave insurrections. Beginning in the early eighteenth century, southern citizens supplemented the nascent police department by serving on "slave patrols" designed to retrieve runaway slaves and prevent slave revolts. 24 Territorial expansion and tensions produced by slavery stretched the limits of community policing. Throughout the rural south and the west, wherever sheriffs and slave patrols failed to 25 preserve the peace, bands of vigilantes filled the vacuum. The turn of the eighteenth century witnessed unprecedented urban growth. Between 1790 and 1830, due in part to immigration from central and northern Europe, as well as mass industrialization and migration from rural America, cities almost quadrupled in size. 6 In the decades after 1830, urban centers experienced a population 27 boom that would not subside for close to a century.
Faced with increased crime and social tension that accompanied such sudden growth and diversity, the larger American cities took their cue from across the Atlantic and began to establish more organized hierarchical police forces designed primarily to prevent crime by constant patrol. (1999) . 24 Id. at 14-17. Shortly after its successful struggle for independence, Texas established its own police force, called the Texas Rangers, to protect the frontier from Mexicans and the Indians. The Rangers persisted after Texas joined the Union in 1845 but they were absorbed into the Confederate army during the war and ultimately displaced by the state police instituted during Reconstruction. When the Democrats took power in 1874, they reestablished the Rangers. PRASSEL, supra note 16, at 151-54.
counterpart, the police throughout America remained under municipal control throughout the century. 3 The decentralized local nature of American policing persisted, in part, out of adherence to an important theoretical ideal tying the people to the execution of their laws. The European state and national police forces-far removed from ordinary citizens-were perceived as uniquely undemocratic, quasi-military forces.
Alexis de Tocqueville commented on the decentralized structure of American law enforcement, observing that it was nonetheless effective because individuals felt that reporting crimes and assisting in law enforcement was an integral part of their responsibility as citizens of a democratic state.
32
What is important is not the accuracy of Tocqueville's somewhat romantic rendition of American law enforcement, but rather the theoretical appeal of local, decentralized police to a nineteenth-century democratic vision.
In fact, local police could not possibly accommodate the increasingly national scope of criminal syndicates. Even before the Civil War, private detective agencies lent their expertise to assist the fledgling municipal police in capturing outlaws like Jesse James and Butch Cassidy, whose notorious crimes spanned city and state boundaries. 33 The most famous of these was the Pinkerton National
Detective Agency, founded in 1855 by Allan Pinkerton, a Scottish immigrant living in Chicago. 34 Prior to the Civil War, the agency also served as a labor spy service, providing businesses with "spotters" who disguised themselves as workers to detect lazy or dishonest employees. 35 Gaining expertise and national prominence in the Civil War, the Pinkertons assisted the Chief of the Secret Service by infiltrating the confederate ranks. After the war, labor conflict reached a heightened pitch. Employed essentially as spies for the state, the Pinkertons used informers and undercover agents to undermine union strike efforts and assist the government in labor discipline. 37 Hired initially by private businesses, the Pinkertons often ended up working with local police and federal officials in staging 38 undercover operations. Up until the end of the nineteenth century, police served a far broader social role than in our modern conception. They bore much of the burden of social welfare, housing the homeless, and caring for the poor during that early periodf By the 1890s, however, the police were engaged less actively in the problems of every-day life. They abandoned care for the homeless and focused almost exclusively on crime control. 40 Historian Eric Monkkonen argues that this shift precipitated a greater distrust, estrangement, and anonymity between the city residents and their police. 4 ' During this same period, police organization mirrored the decentralized nature of urban American politics. Aldermen or city councilmen nominated police chiefs for their own wards. 42 Throughout the country the police gradually allied with corrupt city politicians and grew increasingly ineffective at managing the escalating crime rates. 43 This was in part due to the steep increase in urban crime, combined with the forces' poor organization and rudimentary equipment. 44 But it also resulted from a kind of deliberate tolerance, and at times, an outright acceptance of vice. Because police depended on revenue from crime just as the politicians depended on votes and fees from the police, officers did not attempt to suppress crime or vice; they regulated it. 49 Police in Chicago, for example, facilitated illicit activity by dividing their beats between warring gangs of pickpockets. They staged arrests so that angry victims would feel vindicated, and then promptly released the culprit for a small fee. 5 0 To further this symbiotic relationship, detectives developed a network of informers and maintained extensive relationships with the underworld. As historian Mark Haller observed about the Chicago police at the turn of the century, "[e]ven conscientious detectives were so involved with the underworld that there was only a thin line between being guardians against crime and partners with criminals." 5 The situation did not escape the vigilance of the progressive reform movement.5 2 In fact, the police-an all too concrete symbol of the success of immigrant values over middle-class mores-became one of the central objects of the movement's attention. Not only were detectives and officers tolerating vice and crime, they were lining their pockets with the proceeds. As a result, policemen proved ineffectual at preventing other sorts of street crimes. They spent 49 FOGELSON, supra note 31, at 32. 50 Haller, supra note 48, at 332.
'5 Idat 331. 52 See WALKER, supra note 28, at 65-66; see also BERMAN, supra note 46, at 2-14; FOGELSON, supra note 31, at 2-12. In New York City, the reform movement managed to set up an investigative committee chaired by Republican Senator Clarence Lexow to examine police corruption. See BERMAN, supra note 46, at 31-32. The report, together with mounting public concern, culminated in the election of the antiTammany mayor William Strong. Id. Success, however, proved short-lived. Id. Like most cities, corruption persisted in police and municipal government well into this century. Id. 53 The historiography of the progressive era reform movement is vast, and historians disagree about the precise meaning of the term. Among the contending overviews are ALLEN F. DAVIS, SPEARHEADS OF REFORM: THE SOCIAL SETTLEMENTS AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT, 1890-1914 (1968) their days at the local saloon, tavern, and brothels, anywhere but their respective beat. 4 Beginning around the turn of the century, reformers both inside and outside of the department sought to purge the police of such corruption and remove the force from the taint of the lower class immigrants' questionable moral compass. In the spirit of the times, reformers pushed for greater professionalism) 6 Following the example of August Vollmer, the Chief of Police in Berkeley, California, reformers advocated more scientific methods of crime detection, standardized admission requirements, formal education, centralization, improved technology, and higher standards of policing)5
Meanwhile, businesses took matters into their own hands, hiring private detectives to protect their interests. Government officials joined forces only after private detectives had employed covert tactics to uncover the crime) s For instance, in Wisconsin, an employer, suspecting that a disgruntled employee whom he recently fired posed a threat, hired a detective to seek out the employee and try to embroil him in a scheme to blow up his former place of business5 9 The private detectives informed the police only after they had encouraged the employee to buy dynamite and other explosives. 0 Businesses also hired private detective agencies to uncover crime and city corruption that threatened their chances at prized government contracts. In Ohio, a manufacturer's association hired the Burns Detective Agency to root out corruption in the Columbus city government. 6 After 1920, police reform enjoyed some modicum of success. Centralized bureaucracies began to replace decentralized precincts, which wrested some control from ward politicians. Reformers managed to impose certain educational standards and routine training. 64 The success of police reform tacked with the ebb and flow of municipal reform in general. Formal authority, however, did not always correspond to actual power, and ward leaders retained a large degree of power well into the century even as they grew wary of displaying it with the abandon of earlier decades." Beginning in the early 1900s, reformers in some states did succeed in organizing state police forces. In the nineteenth century, only Massachusetts and Texas had state police. That same year, the government created the Secret Service to protect the newly standardized currency."° At first, the agency consisted of a few private detectives, who quickly developed a fairly sophisticated system of informers and stool pigeons to pursue the increasingly rampant and extensive counterfeit rings. ' By the late nineteenth century, however, the Secret Service became a kind of allpurpose federal police department, lending its expertise to almost any federal agency that needed it. 8 93 Perhaps the single most important catalyst in creating a federal law enforcement presence and linking municipal police to a broad national agenda was the advent of national prohibition. 94 The Eighteenth Amendment, which went into effect in 1920, and its statutory counterpart the Volstead Act, 95 passed the year before, gave 96 federal agents license to intervene in unprecedented ways. National prohibition promoted and deepened the relations between local, state, and national law enforcement as federal officials worked in conjunction, and shared information, with local police.
9 ' Thus, prohibition institutionalized the federal wing of law enforcement while simultaneously increasing the scope and creativity of its undercover tactics." During prohibition, the blurring of this side and that side of the law, prevalent in progressive-era urban machine politics, took on 92 JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 171-72. 9"1 ld. at 171. 9 See generally KENNETH M. MURCHISON, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW DOCTRINE: THE FORGOTTEN INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL PROHIBITION 1-22 (1994). The movement for national prohibition actually began a century earlier. In 1826, temperance workers formed the American Society for the Promotion of Temperance. Id. at 4. In the 1840s, reformers concentrated increasingly on moral persuasion rather than legislation. Id. In the following decade, however, leaders of the temperance movement pushed once again for prohibitory legislation. They achieved their first success in Maine in 1851, but many state courts overruled temperance legislation and by 1869 only six states had extant prohibitory laws. Id. at 4-5. In the second half of the nineteenth century, reformers formed the Prohibition party, which helped defeat James G. Blaine in the 1884 presidential election. In 1874, the movement gathered momentum when evangelical reformers formed the Women's Christian Temperance Union. Id. at 5. In 1893, the Anti-Saloon league emerged with a new pragmatic non-partisan agenda. Id. It ultimately succeeded in securing prohibitory laws in a majority of states. Id. at 6. In the early twentieth century, the league succeeded in building a political base, lobbying for national anti-liquor regulations, and ultimately pushing for national prohibition. Id. at 6-7. 
II. HISTORY OF THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE
Entrapment caught the attention of judges and academics in the context of this rapidly transforming system of law enforcement. It gradually took hold amidst the increasingly interrelated and invasive tactics of both federal and local police. While it is impossible to locate an exact date-a moment in time when the nature of policing shifted in some critical way-entrapment emerged as law enforcement itself had grown so remote from the original ideal discussed by Tocqueville in mid-century as to be virtually unrecognizable.
Historian Kenneth Murchison argues that entrapment was a judicial response to national prohibition. Prohibition was clearly a key factor in the consolidation of this new defense, and it may, indeed, have been critical in causing the Supreme Court to recognize a universal federal entrapment defense. By looking at the state and federal cases both before and after national prohibition in the context of the history of law enforcement in general, it becomes clear that entrapment was not only a reaction to prohibition, but also a cumulative response to the changed nature of government. Entrapment profoundly altered the relationship 99 See MURCHISON, supra note 94, at 43. between officials on all levels of government and the average citizen. This section of the article posits that entrapment has gone through three different stages: first, the nineteenth-century private law model of entrapment; second, the emergence of the defense as a means of exonerating criminals who were "created" by the state; and finally, the academic push for an objective model of entrapment designed to deter government misconduct.
4
No state or federal court recognized entrapment as a valid defense prior to 1870. State courts did develop and apply a common law consent doctrine based on private law notions of contract that provided a prototype for the later developed entrapment doctrine. The doctrine of consent dictates that if force (or lack of consent) is an element of a crime and the victim cooperates with authorities in capturing the perpetrator, then courts cannot convict because the very act of entrapping the criminal negates a material aspect of the crime.' 5 In Eggington's Case,' 0 6 an English decision from 1801, a band of robbers planned to rob a manufactory near Birmingham. They contacted Phillips, a servant and watchman of the business, to gain valuable assistance in their plan. Phillips apparently agreed to help but promptly reported the illicit plot to the proprietor, Mr. Boulton. Boulton instructed Phillips to continue with the plan, contacted authorities, and stood in wait as the unsuspecting robbers entered his place of business. The court noted that when a property owner cooperates with authorities in capturing a burglar, he essentially assents to the entry, thereby negating trespass, an essential element of the crime. All justices agreed, however, that knowledge of an impending crime did not constitute consent to its commission. Because Boulton did nothing to encourage the crime, he did not assent to the entry, and the robbers were guilty as charged.' 0 7
American courts used this consent doctrine in some form or another throughout the early part of the century. 00 Prior to the Civil War, courts in the South used Eggington's Case and similar precedents to enforce various laws related to slavery. In 1832, for instance, a South Carolina court upheld the conviction of a prisoner charged with stealing a slave."' The defendant approached someone else's 104 I have not put dates on these periods because there is significant overlap and the shift occurs at different times in state and federal courts. slave and attempted to persuade the slave to run away with him." 0 The slave reported the story to his master who contacted authorities and instructed the slave to act as if he were going to comply.", The slave owner and the local police stood in wait and ultimately captured the thief in the act." 2 The court held, much like the earlier English case, that the complicity of the slave owner does not negate the element of "taking by force" because an attempt to detect a crime already in progress does not constitute assent.1 3 There was no meeting of the minds because the thief did not know that the owner had agreed." 4 Thus, the court held the victim did not agree to have his property taken and the defendant was guilty as charged. " 5 After the Civil War, courts continued to draw on this line of precedent, especially in cases involving burglary. As with the earlier cases, courts tended to find a way around the formal consent doctrine by manipulating the idea of assent or "the meeting of the minds," which is common in contract law. Thus, some courts, following the formal law of contract and agency, concluded that if a decoy was employed by the police to participate in the burglary with the consent of the owner, there was no burglary." 6 Some courts dismissed the consent defense by insisting that an owner, who knows about a crime in advance and informs authorities, has not given his assent to the crime-an act which would negate an element of the trespass.117 Either way, until the very end of the century, most state courts would not excuse the defendant merely because the detective initiated, induced, or precipitated the events if the prosecution could prove that all the formal elements of the crime were present. The defense argued that the plaintiffs could not recover because their cause of action was based on an immoral or illegal act.
To support this proposition, the defense invoked a common contract principle: courts will not lend their aid in enforcing an agreement which has, as its ultimate object, the violation of the law or public policy, or the perpetration of a fraud upon a third party.' 2 3 The court reasoned that because Backus was guiltier than the Commissioners, the two were not in pari delicto,1 24 and the court ought not shield the more guilty party from the consequences of his act.
In an extended coda, the court praised the law enforcement techniques used not only to uncover violations of excise laws but also to root out mail fraud and counterfeit rings.1
At mid-nineteenth century, courts primarily expressed their approval of law enforcement tactics involving deceit and trickery to catch criminals. In 1857, for instance, Illinois authorities hired a witness to buy liquor from an individual suspected of violating state prohibition laws.
12 7 In dismissing an attempt at the entrapment defense, the court admonished:
If men who voluntarily or otherwise become acquainted with the secret brothels, gambling and drinking hells with which our cities and villages are sometimes overrun, and our neighbors and our children are corrupted and ruined, are to lose their character for veracity, and are to be denounced as informers and spies, for seeking out and bringing these evil practices to light, then are our hopes of protection slight indeed. The stool pigeon and the police stood by and arrested him as he shuffled through the papers. 3 In reversing the conviction on the ground that the state consented to the entry, the court chastised:
[t]he course pursued by the officers in this case was utterly indefensible. Where a person contemplating the commission of an offense approaches an officer of the law, and asks his assistance, it would seem to be the duty of the latter, according to the plainest principles of duty and justice, to decline to render such assistance, and to take such steps as would be likely to prevent the commission of the offense [.] 14
Another court insisted that "it is one of the most disgraceful instances of criminal contrivance to induce a man to commit a crime in order to get him convicted that has ever been before us." ' The judge continued by positing that "it is a diabolical business, which if not punishable probably ought to be.' 36 An Illinois court echoed this new sentiment: "[s]uch means and agents are more dangerous to the welfare of society than are the crimes they were intended to detect and the criminals they were to arrest.', 3 7
The state cases involving informers and decoys between the close of the Civil War and the turn of the century dealt with a large number of scenarios. Other courts simply held that entrapment could never excuse defendants of violating liquor laws because the law itself did not require malicious intent. 4 3 A minority of courts, however, either reversed or modified the sentence after severely criticizing the government's tactics. 44 While courts encountered the defense with a good deal more frequency after 1920, the percentage of cases excusing a defendant on the ground that he was entrapped remained fairly constant throughout the early part of the century. Early traces of this shift can be found in the last few decades of the nineteenth century. Courts edged toward a new understanding of the law that ultimately evolved into the entrapment defense. Reacting with increasing outrage at police tactics, the courts began to recognize, albeit in superfluous language not directly related to the holding of the case, that contract principles could not comprehend the concept they wished to convey.
Thus, a Michigan court concluded that it is the role of the state "to tend to the elevation and improvement of the would-be criminal, rather than to his further debasement.' In another case, the same court noted that the fact that a defendant had a bad, immoral character could not justify luring him into a specific crime. In the late 1890s in Momence, Illinois, a city councilman hired a private detective firm to prevent a string of robberies that seemed to be plaguing the area."' The detective came to town and befriended some local boys by lavishing them with money and treating them to expensive cigars and liquor.1 5 4 After weeks of feigned friendship, the detective convinced the defendants to join him in robbing an office.
5 5
The appeals court reversed the burglary conviction and firmly noted that this foreign detective's "efforts were not directed to the arrest of criminals, but his mental powers and robust health, with the use of money, were directed towards an effort to make criminals of these young men.'1 56 The court commented, "with plenty to drink and smoke and eat at his expense, he sought to undermine and dazzle their mental and moral strength and lead them into the commission of crime." ' ' 7 The principles of contract and the consent doctrine played a minor role in the case. Rather, the malleability of human nature, the power of the state, and the state's endless resources to transform that nature and change the normal course of events by creating criminals impressed the court. 157-58 (1998) . Romanticism is an elusive term but it largely describes a shift from the sacred to the secular, an effort to reconfigure old norms in new ways. Thus, as one critic notes, romanticism constituted a broad cultural transformation designed to "save traditional concepts, schemes, and values which had been based on the relation of the Creator to his creature and creation, but to reformulate them within the prevailing two-term system of subject and object, ego and non-ego, the human mind By the 1920s, the old incarnation of entrapment, applicable only when the victim's consent vitiates a material element of the crime, virtually disappeared. In its place, state courts developed the modern version of the entrapment defense. This modern version focuses on whether criminal intent originated with the defendant. A successful defense proved that the government manipulated the defendant into committing a crime he would not otherwise have consummated. 161 Thus, the courts evaluated the actions of government officials and their informers only insofar as they were relevant in determining the origin of criminal design.
62 Toward the end of the 1920s, one court approved of the following instruction on entrapment: where the defendant "had no criminal intent to violate the . . . [law], but is induced to become a law violator by reason of the arts and wiles of public officials to depart from the path of being a law-abiding citizen into the commission of crime. ' 6 3 Another court clarified, "it is not proper, even during an investigation, to entice or persuade any one contrary to his own will or inclination, to violate the laws of this state; and if you find that the criminal design originated not with the accused, but was conceived in the mind of the officers of the state, and the accused was by persuasion or inducement lured into the commission of a criminal act," then it is proper to acquit.'6 By the end of the prohibition decade, this language was quite common, and the question of entrapment had shifted almost entirely from a formal analysis of the elements of the crime and the evaluation of consent or consciousness and its transactions with nature."
M Avery approached the defendant and offered him $100 to raid Dr. Sanders's office and steal the medical examination results.' 7 The appeals court reversed the conviction, but not on the ground that Dr. Sanders consented to the burglary, but because the criminal intent originated with Dr. Sanders, an agent of the government, not with the defendant.) 6 Therefore, the government could not prosecute because it had implanted the intent in the defendant's mind.
169
Not surprisingly, federal courts dealt with different sorts of crimes and thus, the entrapment defense arose in different contexts. The trajectory and development of the federal defense followed the state courts but lagged behind by about two decades. Regulating everyday life was largely the business of the states prior to the twentieth century; ' 7 during this period the federal system rarely encountered the kinds of law enforcement tactics that drew the criticism and ire of state court judges. It makes sense, therefore, that entrapment simply would not come up in federal courts.
By the turn of the century, the entire body of federal criminal law was changing and expanding quite significantly. other words, Congress began using the commerce clause to regulate sex, morals, and daily conduct-areas that had previously occupied a predominantly local concern. Not only did the federal government venture into new territory, it also contributed to the growing number of victimless crimes, crimes against the public, or more particularly, crimes against public morality. 7 3 All of these new crimes were difficult to detect without developing elaborate systems of information and links with the underworld. 74 Significantly, in 1876, Congress passed a statute 17 5 which imposed criminal sanctions on anyone who sent obscene matter through the mail." 7 Shortly thereafter, an agent of an anti-vice squad in St. Louis, known as "The Society of the Suppression of Vice," approached postal inspectors with his suspicion that a particular doctor was violating the law. 77 The postal employees eagerly approved of the agent's plan and the agent proceeded to compose a letter to his suspect requesting information about contraception.
7 He signed his request with a made-up name, Miss Nettie G. Harlan of Butler, Georgia, and put it in the mail. When the doctor responded with only thinly veiled illicit information, the postal employees pulled his letter from the mail and gave it to the agent. 79 Relying, in part, on the consent doctrine drawn from the state burglary cases, the court, in United States v. Whittier," s° reasoned that even though the defendant is "as morally guilty as if the letter he was answering had been written by a person seeking the prohibited information, and not by a detective," the situation lies outside the particular language of the statute. 81 In other words, because the defendant's letter was written and addressed to a fictitious person, there is no way that it could have given "the prohibited information" to anyone, as required by law. 82 Patterned once again on private law, on crime with a perpetrator and a victim, the court developed the first federal precursor to 172 FRIEDMAN, supra note 86, at 265.
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See id. at f24-57. 174 Id. Vol. 33:257 entrapment law. Applying an extremely formal interpretation of the statute, a method in vogue at that time, the court dismissed the indictment. 'I 3 This doctrine concerning decoys and mail fraud persisted for decades. Like the analogous state court doctrine of consent, however, it evolved and changed. In the 1880s and 90s, courts stretched the private law concepts to their extreme.
1 4 A federal court in Illinois argued that contributory negligence on the part of the government could not constitute a defense unless the government somehow broke the causal relationship between the offender and the offense." 5 Courts simply did not have the language to explain the concept. They grasped at familiar doctrine for help, but the causal relationship between offender and offense proved an odd and awkward way of explaining voluntariness. Feeling the limits of private law concepts, courts picked up on the tone of the concurring opinion in Whittier. Writing separately, Judge Treat focused less on the letter of the law or the fictitious nature of the "victim," and insisted that what was really appalling was the government's effort to "induce or manufacture crime.' 8 7 Faced with the same or similar statutes, courts further developed that rationale, arguing that the defendants were not guilty and convictions could not stand where government officials procured the crime. ' Following Whittier, one court rejected an entrapment defense to the aforementioned statute, arguing that law enforcement traps warrant reversal "when the defendant was the passive tool of the entrapping party." '89 The first entrapment case, outside of the mail fraud decoy context, reached the federal courts in 1915. 2 Seven years earlier, California immigration agents suspected that Woo Wai, a ChineseAmerican merchant, had information about a smuggling ring, which was so pervasive that it involved various high-level government officials.' 93 Hoping to arrest Woo Wai for violating the immigration laws and get him "in the door" so he would provide information on the other suspects, the government agents sought to involve him in an elaborate plan to smuggle illegal Chinese aliens from Mexico.
94
Woo Wai refused to participate on several occasions. 195 Undaunted, officials used government funds to hire a detective who brought Woo Wai from San Francisco to San Diego on two separate occasions in order to entice him to join the operation."" 6 After two trips down the coast and extensive coaxing, Woo Wai finally acquiesced. 97 Poised as Woo Wai crossed the border with the illegal aliens in tow, immigration agents arrested him and offered him immunity if he cooperated in uncovering the smuggling operation.'" He refused, opting instead to go to trial on the charge that he conspired to bring illegal aliens across the border in violation of the immigration laws.' 9 At trial, Woo Wai argued that the government agents had unfairly lured him into the crime. First, it drew on the state court consent doctrine to reason that because the government consented to the admission of the aliens, there was no offense. Second, the court offered its innovative spin: "sound public policy can be upheld only by denying the criminality of those who are thus induced to commit acts which infringe the letter of the criminal statutes. 0 2 Distinguishing relevant state law cases and echoing others, the court held that when the criminal intent does not originate in the mind of the defendant, he cannot be held responsible. Thus, the precedent was set. The court offered two rationales: the first, reminiscent of the older state cases, reasoned by analogy to private law doctrine; and, the second, insisted that an act simply was not "criminal" if the government itself manufactured the crime and manipulated the defendant into committing it. 20 
5
As the cases progressed into the twentieth century, the language of consent became more rare, muted by the more pervasive rationale that an individual defendant cannot act of his own free will if he was sufficiently manipulated by the government. A few years later, another case arose out of similar facts.
2 2
6
The court concluded without much difficulty, " [w] here the officers of the law have incited the party to commit the crime charged and lured him on to its consummation, the law will not authorize a verdict of guilty.°2 0 7 Like the later state cases, the federal courts that acknowledged the entrapment defense in the 1910s focused on the origin of the criminal intent.
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Courts disagreed on where to draw the line, and as Kenneth Murchison artfully argues, the outcome of their reasoning often reflected their own, and the public's, attitude to the law under which the defendant was indicted.
q
The early state and federal entrapment cases, however, did not only involve violations of prohibition laws. Like Woo Wai and the state bribery cases, many were the result of the efforts of an overzealous reform movement, which had gradually made its way into various wings of law enforcement. What is striking about the cases that recognize the defense is not the particular statutes under which they arose, but rather the organized and sophisticated nature of the law enforcement offensive considered by the courts. Both federal and state courts had to reinvent the doctrine The subtle shift in language may not have had a huge impact on who served time for which crime, but significantly, both defense lawyers and judges now framed their understanding of criminal responsibility in a new way. The idea that the government could "create" a criminal was a new concept. The twentieth-century legal doctrine of entrapment, which embodied the idea that the state wielded some kind of power to manipulate the very essence of its citizens, was an innovation in the law. The later state and federal entrapment cases made the implication of this new focus on criminal intent explicit, excusing a criminal defendant only when the state authorities created him. Thus, one state court admonished, "decoys and artifices may be employed to entrap criminals, but not to create them. ' "° Another rejected the defendant's claim that the state officials were engaged in a "conspiracy to create a criminal.
2 ' 1 In a West Virginia court, the judge grasped at various metaphors to explain the law, stating, there can be no entrapment unless "the defendant was plastic clay in the hands of the entrappers .... It is not the decoy of a criminal which public policy condemns but the implanting of the germ of criminality, no matter how favorable the culture. 21 2 Federal courts used the same language to express alarm at the government's ability to distort the will of its citizens. In an attempt to catch a suspect violating an act that prohibed the sale of liquor to Indians, federal officials hired a witness who did not appear to be an Indian. 213 The court declared, " [d] ecoys are permissible to entrap criminals, but not to create them, to present opportunity to those having intent to or willing to commit crime but not to ensnare the law-abiding in unconscious offending. The federal cases that followed in the 1920s similarly focused the inquiry on the power of the state, through sheer force of persuasion, to change the course of human conduct and eradicate individual free will.
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While the shift was subtle, it is nonetheless evident. The earlier cases defined will, freedom, and voluntariness by reference to actions. If a defendant committed an illegal act without physical coercion in the nineteenth-century cases, he did so of his free will. The consent doctrine, for instance focused on the victim's acquiescence in the crime, not on the defendant's free will, because the voluntariness of the defendant's actions was presupposed. This mirrors the biblical interaction of Eve and the serpent. The reason God did not excuse Eve is that she acted against his edict, and was therefore culpable. The serpent wielded a good deal more power than Eve and his tactics were certainly unfair, but in the mind of the Old Testament Deity and the New York court which invoked Him, that was not really relevant. By the twentieth century, courts had taken a noticeable turn. In response to a new kind of state with an intricate network of national, local, and private law enforcement tools at its fingertips, courts generated and adopted the following new concepts: (1) that an individual's will can be undermined; (2) that an individual's personality can evolve and change; and (3) that an individual free from coercion is not necessarily free. Under this rubric, an individual is not responsible for his acts if the state manipulated his will.. The older idea of character based on a Judeo-Christian conception of the fixed and unchanging self, with virtues and vices that can be more or less controlled by the individual, dominated earlier case law. , 1986) . The shift from the religious to the secular in the law occurred throughout the nineteenth century, but it was especially significant after the Civil War. Thus, this shift in notions of the self was just one aspect of a much broader trend away from religious conceptions of the self. See generally Ross, supra note 56, at 53-64; ABRAMS, supra note 154. no longer suited the modern world.
2 ' 9 The trial court invoked Jesus in its jury charge stating, "on the night before the crucifixion, Jesus tempted Judas Iscariot: that he could have remained away and saved Judas Iscariot from committing the despicable crime.., of betraying his master." It may be argued, the court continued, that Jesus tempted Judas, but that provided no excuse because "it was in the heart of this man." 220 On appeal, the court concluded that it was an error to rule out the entrapment defense altogether and noted that the instruction was unduly prejudicial.
'
The emergence of the defense based on the vulnerability of individuals and the elusiveness of free will embodied a definition of freedom and individuality that direcdy contradicted older biblical notions.
As the doctrine developed across the continent, federal courts gradually proved more liberal in ordering lower courts to consider all the evidence related to the entrapment defense. While the widely controversial prohibition laws might have served as a catalyst, the array of cases in the early part of the twenty-first century set the stage. The language of the defense was already well established in both the federal and state courts by the time the prohibition cases flooded the courts. Prohibition may have brought entrapment to the attention of the federal judiciary in a way that it found hard to ignore but the defense had already developed over the course of many decades as a collective response to a radically changed universe of law enforcement.
Meanwhile, legal commentators were largely unmoved by the judicial development of the entrapment defense. Nineteenth-century treatises rarely mentioned the subject and if they did, they did so by explaining the doctrine of consent. 224 In the early decades of the twentieth century, the defense drew few comments from students cataloguing cases and even fewer scholarly studies.
In the second half of the prohibition decade, however, academics took a greater interest in entrapment and, like the courts, they seemed to embrace the defense as if it had always been around. 2 7 These later comments, like the court cases they discussed, generally noted that entrapment serves as a successful defense where the criminal intent originates with the government agents rather than the accused.
2 28 As one commentator put it in the late 1920s, courts apply the defense when "acts of the officers instigating and procuring the crime have gone so far as to wash the necessary guilty intent from the mind of the accused and render him a mere tool with no intent.
''2 2 9 Another commentator remarked that the origin of the criminal design is only the beginning of the inquiry; entrapment can only succeed as a defense if the government deprived the accused of "volition and willing compliance. ' 3 0 Others put it slightly differently, arguing that if government officials produce a crime that the defendant would not otherwise have committed, the defendant can claim that he was unjustly entrapped.
2 3 ' Treatises in the second half of the century echoed this sentiment.
2
While prohibition did not create the entrapment defense, the growing skepticism about liquor laws prompted both courts and commentators to adopt a new rationale for the defense. At the end of the decade, scholars argued that the entrapment defense was worthwhile because it served to deter the overly aggressive and invasive behavior of law enforcement officials. They argued that whether or not the government agents had reasonable suspicion and acted in good faith prior to setting their trap provides a doctrinal check on executive power. make a subtle appearance in a few cases in the mid-twenties. In these cases, courts never explicitly invoked deterrence as the purpose of entrapment, rather, courts suggested that if the government agents implemented a trap without reasonable suspicion, they acted contrary to public policy, which counsels against inducing individuals to commit crimes, and dictates that courts should not countenance such conduct.
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While the lower courts and academics struggled to define the contours of the entrapment defense, the Supreme Court remained silent.
2 3t6 It was not until 1928 that the Court acknowledged this new defense in federal criminal law. The case which first made its way to the United States Supreme Court was a narcotics case: Federal agents suspected that Casey, an attorney, was soaking towels with illegal opiates and delivering them to federal prisoners at a county jail.
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Federal narcotics agents recruited George Cicero, a convicted felon and drug addict, and Mrs. Nelson, another prisoner's sister-in-law, to serve as their stool pigeons.
The agents installed a dictaphone in Justice Brandeis dissented. 2 2 He remarked that he could not consider the substantive offense because "officers of the government instigated the commission of the alleged crime." 2 3 Justice Brandeis clarified that his objection does not rest merely upon the character of the evidence or upon the fact that the evidence was illegally obtained. 44 The obstacle to the prosecution lies in the fact that the alleged crime was instigated by officers of the government; that the act for which the government seeks to punish the defendant is the fruit of their criminal conspiracy to induce its commission. 245 Further, the Justice insisted that the government could set decoys and lay traps, "[b]ut it may not provoke or create a crime and then punish the criminal, its creature., 246 Categorizing Casey as a "detective-made criminal," Brandeis offered two reasons for his dissent, arguing that the court could not sanction the government's unauthorized and unjustifiable conduct and that Casey's action could not be considered an act of his own free will. 247 Four years later, the majority of the Court adopted Brandeis's reasoning. In United States v. Sorrells, the defendant was convicted of violating the National Prohibition Act. At trial, he relied on an entrapment defense, claiming that government agents staged a crime and lured him into committing it.
In an elaborate effort to catch Sorrels in an illicit act, a government agent posed as a tourist and recruited Sorrells's friends to introduce him.
0
After using various intelligence sources, he found out that Sorrells had fought in World War 1.25 ' 1 The agent then pretended to be a veteran of the same Division. After winning his confidence in this cunning way, the agent asked for liquor on three separate occasions.
Sorrells finally gave in. 253 The Court noted that:
the evidence was sufficient to warrant a finding that the act for which defendant was prosecuted was instigated by the prohibition agent, that it was the creature of his purpose, that defendant had no previous disposition to commit it ... and that the agent lured defendant, otherwise innocent, to its commission by repeated and persistent solicitation in which he succeeded by taking advantage of the sentiment aroused by reminiscences of their experiences as 254 companions in arms in the World War.
ChiefJustice Hughes paused, "[s] uch a gross abuse of authority given for the purpose of detecting and punishing crime, and not for the making of criminals, deserves the severest condemnation.
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Following the vast majority of circuits, the Court held that when the criminal design originates with the government, it may not prosecute the individual who it caught and enticed into its plan. While the Supreme Court might have used substantive due process to build the defense permanently into the law, the Court chose not to do so. Instead, the justices insisted that Congress could not possibly have intended its statute to cover a situation like thiswhere government agents lured an innocent person into committing a crime.
Thus, the defense, which just decades before occupied a small and precarious position in both state and federal courts, had evolved into such a commonsense guage of criminal responsibility that the Supreme Court was willing to conclude it would be absurd for Congress to have intended any criminal statute to include prosecution and punishment of those enticed and trapped by government agents." 8 In Sorrells, the government argued that the defendant waived the entrapment defense by not mentioning it in his plea of not guilty and failing to plead it to bar further proceedings 252 Id. The Court rejected this contention, arguing that it follows from the misconception that the defense is not a denial of guilt but rather some sort of judicial bar or equitable doctrine that prevents the government from proceeding when its agents have behaved unjustly.M"° Entrapment, the Sorrells Court explained, "is available, not in the view that the accused though guilty may go free," but rather pertains directly to the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
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It is significant that the Court chose not to use substantive due process, a doctrine employed throughout the previous decades, to defeat reform legislation and protect freedom of contract.
Perhaps perceiving the already precarious position of substantive due process, the Court chose a different track, elevating this new aspect of freedom above such contractual rights.
Justice Roberts wrote separately to emphasize a slightly different basis for his adoption of entrapment. Rather than locate the source of the defense in Congressional intent, Justice Roberts chose to focus on the inherent supervisory power of the courts. His opinion echoed the flurry of academic articles published at the end of the previous decade and a few recent federal cases. The Justice stated that, "[n]either courts of equity nor those administering legal remedies tolerate the use of their process to consummate a wrong. The doctrine of entrapment in criminal law is the analogue of the same rule applied in civil proceedings. ''262 Justice Roberts argued that, while cloaked as an effort to tailor the law to a new view of criminal responsibility, entrapment was really a deterrent. Judges considered entrapment a judicial rule analogous to the various civil law doctrines that prevent plaintiffs from resorting to the courts when they have behaved in an illegal or grossly unethical manner. Thus, as the scope and reach of both state and federal criminal law grew at the end of the century, law enforcement grew with it. Judges and courts, largely without assistance from the academy, invented the doctrine of entrapment to accommodate this new amorphous form of government. 265 By shifting away from private law notions of contract, courts slowly redefined criminal responsibility and realigned the precarious balance between government and the citizen. With little fanfare, courts and legal doctrine contributed to a new definition of free will, one which comprehended the power of the state-through manipulation, trickery, and deception-to alter personality and change the course of human conduct in some fatal way. The dominant justification for entrapment finally articulated by the Supreme Court in Sorrells centered on a definition of freedom and responsibility that had evolved over the past several decades. 66 Some of the later federal cases, many law review commentaries in the later part of the 1920s, and the dissent in Sorrells suggest a related but distinct rationale: that entrapment is necessary for the purity of the government and its various agencies and agents, and the defense somehow deters government abuses of power and should be allowed despite the indisputable guilt of the accused. This sort of reasoning emerged only after most federal and state courts had adopted the defense.
It served only a recessive role-while popular with academics, it did not dominate the early court cases on entrapment.
III. ENTRAPMENT LAW IN CONTEXT
This history of the entrapment defense, discussed in the preceding section, has spawned two warring tests to evaluate whether a defendant was impermissibly entrapped. 67 The first of these tests, the subjective test, asks whether the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime before encouraged to do so by a government actor. 268 The history of law enforcement and entrapment is useful because it illustrates that the defense emerged primarily as a way of redefining criminal responsibility and autonomy after the Civil War. Most courts in the first few decades of the defense reasoned that the accused simply was not guilty if government officials manufactured the crime and molded the criminal. Judges did not use the defense primarily to deter, or even to send a message condemning governmental misconduct until well into the twentieth century. This chronology is relevant because it helps explain why courts have clung rather stubbornly to the subjective test in analyzing entrapment. The two rationales are related in that they both call for a particular boundary between the individual and the state, but the objective test follows logically only if the primary role of the defense is to deter governmental misconduct and preserve the purity of the courts. The subjective test embodies the slightly different earlier concern about what exactly constitutes criminal responsibility: A person cannot be considered responsible if he did not act of his own free will, especially when the government has the power to undermine free will through its control over resources and information, and through its power of persuasion.
Following the lead of early academic reflections on entrapment, most contemporary commentators suggest that courts abandon the impractical, and arguably even futile, subjective test.
73
While attempting to ascertain the criminal predisposition of the accused is a clumsy and imprecise tool, the history of the defense indicates that we should allow courts to try. This particular inquiry enables courts to draw, erase, and redraw the line between government and citizen, a judicial role which has come to make sense to us. Thus, the frustrating task of locating the origin of criminal intent serves an important role in providing doctrinal room to shape an evolving notion of the proper interaction between the state and the individual, and in securing the position of the courts to police the parameters of formulation of the subjective test. See MARCUS, supra note 267, at 38. 27 But, courts do not appear to comply with the cries of the academy. While the theoretical critique of the subjective test is perfectly logical, the subjective formulation perseveres for precisely the same reason that entrapment emerged in the first place; it allows the law to articulate and develop its own version of what it means to act freely in the modern world. By recognizing some elusive moment when the state has managed to manipulate its citizens and undermine free will through sheer force of persuasion, courts generate an evolving definition of freedom and individuality.
In his seminal article, Michael Seidman argues that because
there is no such thing as predisposition, the two tests collapse. Additionally, Allen more convincing argues that predisposition is a fictional entity, a concept that cannot really exist.
2 89 If you assume that almost everyone would commit a crime if provoked or enticed in some extreme way, then predisposition by itself cannot distinguish between those entitled to the entrapment defense and those who are [t] he real point is that talk of "predisposition" is meaningless and commits an existential fallacy. A person who takes the bait has had his price met; a person who does not, has not. But, the person who does not take the bait almost always surely would take a higher, even if greatly higher, bait. The failure to take this one 291 is evidence of his price, but not of predisposition.
Allen goes on to argue that while this "silly" idea of predisposition fails to distinguish between defendants, whether or not they responded to "market level inducements" does.
He insists that we should exonerate only those individuals who responded to inducements that exceed real world market rates9 He envisions both a financial and emotional market. 94 Punishing someone who responds to extra-market inducement could not possibly further the goals of criminal law-to deter, to incapacitate, and to rehabilitatewhile prosecuting a defendant for responding to market level inducements would. 2 95 Responding to an anticipated adversary, Allen argues that it may be difficult to ascertain the market price of inducements but it could not possibly be as futile as the subjective test, which requires "literally proof of the nonexistent." 29 6 Allen scoffs at the courts' efforts to curb the government's power to "create criminals." v A modern-day Jerome Frank, Allen seems to want to purge the law of all its subjective musings. Attempting to determine a precise market level for the kind of emotional manipulation involved in sting operations, however, strikes this writer as equally absurd. He proposes that we estimate this market value by calling in experts. 2 9 He suggests that rather than use the fuzzy evidence to show the defendant's subjective state of mind, courts can use experts to determine the market price for emotional manipulation to commit a crime. Relying on expert evidence and social science in this way ignores the fact that in its unscientific way, the common law generates its own evolving definition of the self, of individuality, and responsibility. While at times, resorting to the social sciences may be appropriate, it cannot always provide the answer to shaky, indeterminate, and subjective doctrinal judgments. Any effort to determine a given defendant's predisposition, like many other concepts in the law, will involve the factfinder's generalizing from her own experience and from what she believes is the normal, average way to act. That this is the case does not necessarily mean courts should abandon efforts to approximate subjective intent. Language is imprecise. But a critique of the law based on this premise, taken to its extreme, threatens to undermine the entire endeavor. If courts defer questions of criminal responsibility and the definition of free will to the social sciences, they essentially abdicate a llen proceeds to argue that given his understanding of entrapment, courts should also apply the doctrine when it is a private individual rather than the state that employs "extra-market" inducements to lure someone into committing a crime.' 0 ' Courts throughout the century have rejected this notion and again, it simply defies commonsense. Entrapment is not a private law concept. To the contrary, it appeared when it did because private law models could not comprehend individual freedom with respect to the modern state. The government could no longer pretend to be a neutral arbiter between individuals, and entrapment served to redefine freedom and criminal responsibility in the face of this changed reality. As such, applying the defense to private actors would be a radical and unwarranted departure from the history of entrapment.
CONCLUSION
Entrapment emerged at the turn of the century as a new way of policing the boundary between the government and the individual. As law enforcement's control over information and intelligence magnified, courts acknowledged the defense. They did so because freedom no longer seemed natural or inevitable in light of the governments newfound power.
While both the objective and subjective tests are sloppy, the idea of predisposition involved in the subjective test is the most reasonable way for courts to determine how much control the defendant had over his own actions and thus, whether he ought to be held responsible. This may require the fact finder to resort to his own experience writ large, to what sort of inducements seem unfair, and to some approximation of what kind of inducements would lead most normal people to commit crimes. Judges and juries do this anyway. While Allen and Seidman's analyses reveal the futility of searching for origins of subjective intent, their critiques echo those of the progressive legal thinkers a century ago. Law in the post-Realist world has in many ways conceded to those sorts of criticisms by focusing largely on objective tests. Entrapment resisted the general trend. In so doing, is one of the arenas of legal doctrine that has preserved a role for courts in redefining individuality and freedom in the face of the radically changed nature of both state and federal government. While it can be useful to expose myths in the law, it is not always necessary to discard them. Asking whether the government created the criminal and whether the accused was predisposed to commit the crime integrates into the law a general notion that the government's monopoly over intelligence and information can undermine free will, and that it is the court's role to preserve and protect it. As Susanna Blumenthal argues in her article on the creative role of the American judiciary, "[a] lthough the American concept of the rule of law may entail the suppression of judicial subjectivity, it seems also to require an exponent in the form of the human judge. ' 0° This irony is difficult for some commentators to comprehend. Thus, they seek to purge the doctrine of its subjective component. Entrapment's stubborn resistance to this trend, however, reflects an understandable need to believe in the rule of law, or more particularly the role of criminal law in punishing only those who are in some personal sense responsible for their actions. At once invoking and critiquing Jerome Frank, Blumenthal concludes, that the fact we continue to trust the "finite figure" of the judge "with a task of such magnitude suggests that he cannot simply be viewed as a romantic survival. He expresses what is perhaps a more fundamental and unyielding human impulse to see beyond ourselves. the subjective test for entrapment is not just a remnant of a more innocent time. While it is true that judges and juries will inject the notion of predisposition with all sorts of their own perceptions, that fact alone does not necessarily counsel against the perpetuation of the concept. By withstanding the trend toward the objective, the history of entrapment illustrates that pockets of the law remain myths that we, as a community, need to believe in. The myth of predisposition, or the unattainable goal of figuring out when the government has created a criminal, is not silly at all. It may be impossible to ascertain with any precision, but it reflects a willingness and desire to believe that our laws are more than just social science applied mechanistically to human interaction. The subjective test in this particular area of the law preserves a certain distinct and useful 304 role for the courts in defining freedom and autonomy. It is part of 302 Blumenthal, supra note 160, at 227-28. 303 Id. at 228. Even if we accept that in some form the subjective test is here to stay, more recent analyses have struggled to make sense of the Supreme Court's definition of "predisposition. 3 0 5 In Jacobson v. United States,3°6 the jury found the defendant guilty of violating a statutory prohibition against knowingly receiving child pornography in the mail. 3°7 The jury rejected Jacobson's entrapment defense and the circuit court affirmed, finding that the government had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he was predisposed to commit the crime. 3 0 8 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Jacobson was entrapped as a matter of law.
Seemingly adhering to the subjective test, the Court insisted that the predisposition analysis is distinct from the nature of the government's conduct. Accordingly, the Court focused on whether Jacobson was predisposed to violate the law before government officials intervened. 3 1 ' Government agents got Jacobson's name from a list of people who had received magazines depicting nude teenage boys before Congress criminalized such conduct. After Congress passed the statute three months later, two separate government agencies coordinated a campaign to tempt the defendant into violating the law. 31 After resisting various solicitations over the course of two years, Jacobson gave in and ordered a child-pornography magazine from a fictitious organization invented by the government.
3 1 2 The Court admitted that Jacobson was predisposed to commit the crime immediately before he purchased the illicit material but noted that the critical inquiry was whether he was equally disposed before the would have never run afoul of the law."). 311 Id. at 543. Among other things, the government sent mailings from fictitious organizations that claimed to be fighting censorship. Others asked him questions about his sexuality as part of a questionnaire. The government even created a fake correspondence from an individual who claimed to share Jacobson's particular sexual perversions. Finally, Jacobson relented and ordered a magazine from one of the fake organizations. See id. at 544-47. 312 Id. at 547. government entangled itself in his life two years before. 3 Ruling that a defendant must be predisposed prior to any government involvement, the Court found the pre-investigation evidence wanting. 4 In the wake of this decision, circuit courts have disagreed over whether Jacobson redefined entrapment to include an objective test for predisposition.
In United States v. Hollingsworth, 3 6 an opinion authored by Judge Posner, the Seventh Circuit held that someone is predisposed to commit a crime if he would have committed it without government interference. 7 Judge Posner argued that Jacobson put a new objective spin on the predisposition analysis, directing us to examine the defendant's objective circumstances to ascertain whether he would have refrained from committing a crime "but for" the government's meddling. 1 In other words, if ample opportunity to commit the crime would have arisen anyway, then the fact that the government provided an additional incentive might not matter. The First Circuit disagreed. 3 9 It held that someone is predisposed if he would have committed the crime given an "ordinary opportunity. In a recent analysis, James Ponsoldt and Stephen Marsh argue persuasively that the objective element in the Seventh Circuit test is simply unwarranted byJacobson. 32 ' Thus, they conclude that "nothing in the Court's opinion ... endorses the notion that a person willing but unlikely to commit a crime is the sort of 'law-abiding citizen' for whom an entrapment defense should be available." 3 While the Court's recent entrapment case lends some support for paying increased attention to the nature of the government's offensive (an objective component), it is perfectly consistent with the early history of entrapment law because it focuses entirely on the defendant's state of mind. Any evidence of exactly what the government did is relevant order to continue to do so, it seems fair to recognize the difficulty of discerning a defendant's state of mind prior to the government's enforcement efforts, but it would be an error to transform the purpose of the defense by resorting to law and economics or policy decisions and replacing the subjective with an objective analysis.
The concept of entrapment emerged when it did because law enforcement outgrew its traditional status, and, perhaps, the defense needs to flex and change with a new breed of national intelligence, which has elaborate new tools at its fingertips. Efforts to trap individuals using modern technology like the Internet should force us to rethink entrapment and to redefine what constitutes predisposition, but it should not change the skeleton of the defense. Judge Posner quite artfully tries to do what Seidman considered inevitable. He wraps what is in essence an objective test in a subjective package. In the process he distorts United States Supreme Court precedent and betrays nearly a century of evolving doctrine. Judge Breyer, to the contrary, has intuited a better way to allow entrapment to evolve in response to the changing nature of law enforcement without altering the fundamental purpose of the defense. The goal of preserving doctrinal room for courts to define individuality and freedom may seem antiquated in our post-Realist world. It is a myth, however, which has persisted. This myth should continue to weave its way, because we, as a community, need to believe in it.
using my historical analysis to argue against Posner's call for an increased reliance on the social sciences. See Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 12 (1998) . Given the history of the defense, it is not appropriate to apply law and economics in this setting. For a discussion of how law and economics might be 
